Electoral System

Elections:

A disadvantage of the old First Past the Post (FPP) electoral system was that it was very difficult to for minor parties to gain any power, resulting in an entrenched dominance of the two major parties and a frequent mismatch between the makeup of parliament and the will of the people. Another disadvantage was that it was easy to split the vote between two similar candidates and have a MP elected that a majority of the electorate disliked. The disadvantage of the current Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system is that a large proportion of the seats in parliament are filled with list MPs whose primary loyalty is with their party rather than to their voters.

The most cited advantage of the MMP system is that the makeup of parliament closely matches the will of the people, but this is only true if you think in terms of parties. There are many other ways that MPs can be divided up, including geographically, and it can be argued that the MMP system can result in a worse match to the will of the people than FPP. The MMP system ensures that parliament is very party centric, with parties generally voting in blocs, and obedience to party hierarchy is the most important trait that is looked for when selecting candidates. Selection by the party (either to a safe seat or on the list) is often the most difficult hurdle for a candidate in their journey to parliament. It seems to me that in many important ways this does not represent the will of the people much at all.

My proposed solution to these problems is changing to a ranked choice voting system, where only electorate MPs are in parliament, but it is easier for minor parties or independents to win seats. This is because voters can safely rank an independent or minor party MP as their first choice without the risk of their vote being wasted (if their preferred candidate is eliminated, their vote goes to their second preference, and so on down). With no list MPs, and a much higher chance of an independent winning a seat, the parties’ selection of candidates becomes less about loyalty to party and more about who is genuinely popular in the electorate. The MPs will also need to be much more loyal to their electorate than to their party if they hope to be re-elected.

To prevent bias being created by the ordering of candidates on voting ballots (there is a strong temptation to fill out the rankings in same order that is on the ballot), the candidates on the ballots should be randomly ordered with different ordering on each ballot.

To further reduce the influence of unelected party bureaucrats, votes in parliament should be conducted individually rather than in party blocs. While parties are still likely to instruct MPs to vote certain ways, it would be easier to follow the will of their electorate and vote against their party. With modern technology it is possible to conduct individual votes in parliament without MPs needing to be physically present in the chamber, so this shouldn't disrupt proceedings much at all.

With no list MPs, and the cabinet not being made up of MPs, the size of parliament could be reduced slightly. With Maori electorates abolished, electorates could be redistricted to align with population, giving an approximately even amount of power to each vote. 100 electorates would mean each MP would represent about 50,000 people, which is a small enough number that any voter with concerns should be able to discuss them with their local MP.

There is a movement to extend the length of the electoral cycle to four years. Parliament is supposed to be representing the will of the voters, and elections are the primary channel of communication for transmitting this will. I do not support any narrowing of this communication bandwidth and think that the electoral cycle should remain at three years. Three years is more than enough time to demonstrate that your policy ideas are good, and the more opportunities we have to hold politicians accountable the better.

Executive Branch:

The main disadvantage of having a parliament made up only of electorate MPs is that they are often elected by campaigning on local issues, and there is no one who must appeal to a majority of the entire population. This could result in parliament becoming a melting pot of conflicting local issues, with no one who had the entire country as their priority. To solve this, I propose that the executive branch of government (the Prime Minister and cabinet) be elected separately from MPs. The Prime Minister would be elected by the entire country using the same ranked choice voting system, who would then appoint ministers to lead each department. MPs could not be ministers, and if appointed they would have to resign their seat, with a by-election electing a new MP.

The Prime Minister would have complete control over the operation of all government departments, would have the right to veto any legislation passed by parliament, but would have to operate within the bounds of a budget passed by parliament. To discourage stalemates in the budget process, if a budget expires without a new one being passed, government spending would continue at existing rates, but all MPs and the Prime Minister would receive no salaries or expense reimbursements until a new budget is passed. If the period without a current budget exceeds 90 days, a new general election would be automatically triggered.

Government departments would be consolidated from 41 into the following 11: Defence, Police, Justice (incl. corrections), Health, Education, Finance, Transport, Conservation, Internal Affairs, Foreign Affairs, and Parliamentary Service. For more detail on the functions of these departments, visit the amalgamation page.

There would be no need for the governor general, and this role would be discontinued, with the Prime Minister becoming the official head of state.

MP Remuneration:

The worse sort of MP is one who is primarily motivated by their salary and benefits, and the best sort is one who is primarily motivated by a desire to improve the country. To discourage the former while still offering a comfortable income, I propose that MPs salaries should be fixed at three times median income (approx. $150k), with the Prime Minister and the Cabinet ministers receiving four times median income (approx. $200k). No distinction would be given to party leaders as this can be gamed and would be less important in a parliament elected by ranked choice. The benefit of fixing MP salaries to median income is that it will incentivize MPs to grow incomes for everyone, as this is the only way they can get a pay rise. No benefits, allowances, pensions or the like would be given in addition to these salaries other than reimbursing expenses directly related to carrying out their role as an MP.

Legislation Expiration Dates:

A major problem with laws and regulations is that they are eternal and tend to accumulate until it is impossible to do anything without massive compliance costs. My proposed solution for this would be for legislation to have an expiration date up to a maximum of ten years from when it was passed. Legislation could be renewed beyond the expiration date, but it would force a review of how effective and necessary the legislation is. It would also encourage the government to write laws that solve problems permanently rather than setting up an eternal bureaucracy to manage it.

For legislation with wide support the expiration date could be overridden if more than two thirds of parliament voted for it. Any legislation passed in this way would also require a two thirds majority vote to amend or repeal. This would also encourage more bipartisan policy making.