Local Government

The public's approval ratings of local government performance in New Zealand are generally low, and this area is ripe for transformation.

Dynamic Boundaries:

One of the most well accepted principles in a democratic society is the principle of subsidiarity - the idea that power over decision making should be devolved to the lowest practical level of government. The lower the level a decision is made at, the closer the decision-maker is to the problem, giving maximum familiarity, responsiveness, and accountability. Making decisions at lower levels also allows for greater flexibility and innovation, allowing policies to be tailored to the needs of smaller populations than would be practical with centrally controlled authorities. Subsidiarity recognises that some decisions are best made at higher levels when coordination, consistency, or scale are important, the key is getting the balance right.

The smaller a local government area is, the more responsible and accountable it will be to its voters and the more tailored its solutions will be to the local needs. The problem is that many of the local government areas in New Zealand are quite large, especially Auckland with almost one third of New Zealand's total population (there are local boards with limited autonomy). If a specific community feels like the local government they are under is not serving their needs well, there is currently almost nothing they can do about it. Small communities within large councils have very little influence on elections or policies, and changing local government boundaries to move between areas, merge, or create new areas is very rare and requires the consent of the national parliament.

To enable smaller communities to take control of their own destiny, I propose that a simple referendum-based process be established to change local government boundaries. The process would be citizen initiated, with 10% of the registered voters in the area requesting the change signing a petition triggering a referendum on the change. A majority of all registered voters would have to approve it in the referendum (not just a majority of those voting), and only those in the area changing would vote unless the proposal involves joining another existing local government, in which case a majority of the registered voters in the area being joined would also have to approve it. Limitations on what changes could be proposed would include that each local government area must be contiguous (no enclaves or exclaves), and a minimum number of registered voters would be required for any new local government area being created. Any successful referendums would take effect from the following election.

To prevent a wave of petitions and referendums when the policy is implemented, each local government area would be required to hold a referendum and any wards or local boards in which a majority of registered voters approve the creation of their own local government would split from the existing area provided it doesn't create a non-contiguous area for the communities that vote to remain together.

Councillor Roles:

One of the key problems leading to the poor performance of local government and the dissatisfaction of voters is that the elected representatives are not the ones that actually implement policies. Elected councillors only have the ability to form strategies, while the implementation of the strategy is left to permanent and unelected bureaucrats. Councillors elected with a mandate for change are often frustrated at their inability to directly control the policies that affect their voters.

Another issue with councillors (and other types of elected representatives) is that each voter only has one vote each election. It is very unlikely that voters will find a candidate that represents them on every issue, and they have to choose one based on how they align on their most importance issues even if they disagree on many other issues. Elections are the primary channel for voters to communicate their will to their elected representatives, but one vote every three years is a laughably narrow bandwidth. What frequently end up happening is that councillors act according to the wishes of a loud few who are motivated to lobby them (often due to vested interests), even if this doesn't reflect the wishes of the wider population.

To solve both these problems, I propose that local governments be reorganised into three divisions, and councillors are elected to directly manage a specific division. Each division would have a single councillor elected to manage it, and voters would have three votes each election - one for who most aligned with their wishes in each division, with the winning candidate elected using ranked choice voting. Any bureaucrats or other employees that work in these divisions would be under the direct control of the elected councillor and have their contracts terminated at each election, although incoming councillor could rehire them if they wished. This would make policy implementation much more responsive to voters and would give voters triple the amount of granularity when communicating their wishes each election.

The three divisions would be Infrastructure, WeFacilities (each discussed in more detail below). They would be subject to the same transparency requirements as the national government, with all payments, documents, and communications being made public. Each department would be financially independent from each other, and they would be required to always have a surplus of funds on hand (if they don't, the councillor's salary would be paused until they regain a surplus). Debt would be allowed for capital expenditure, but the operational budget must be able to be met the repayments. To maintain an element of competitive pressure to keep costs down, all construction and operation of services by these division must be performed by private contractors who win contracts through an open tender process, although the divisions would generally retain ownership of infrastructure assets.

To prevent a rouge councillor from causing unexpected chaos or damage to an area, any accumulated changes of more than 20% to the division's budget or debt levels that weren't explicitly campaigned on by the winning candidate during the previous election could be challenged in court. An exception to this would be if the councillors of all three divisions unanimously agree to the change, which could be necessary during an emergency or an unexpected change in circumstances.

Infrastructure:

The infrastructure division would be further split into two departments: roading and three waters.

The roading department would be responsible for the designing, consenting, construction, and maintenance of all roads and related facilities (footpaths, carparks, public toilets, rest areas, etc.) within the area, with the exception of any state highways and privately operated roads. The department would set rates for and receive road toll revenue for the roads they are responsible for and would be 100% funded by these tolls with no ability to collect property rates. Any arterial roads that are key links between local government areas would be transferred to national government control to enable a bigger picture view of the transport network and prevent price gouging of traffic only passing through the area.

The three waters department would be responsible for the provision of fresh water, sewerage collection, and stormwater management, and would be funded by a combination of user fees and targeted property rates. Repayments of debt relating to the construction of infrastructure would be funded by rates targeting the properties that are connected to or benefit from the infrastructure, and operational costs would be funded by metered water usage fees. New developments could opt to have three waters services provided by a private company rather than connecting to existing infrastructure. Local governments that are part of a larger urban area could create a joint venture company that provides bulk water infrastructure to the entire region, enabling economies of scale to be taken advantage of.

A third responsibility of this division would be selecting zones for each property and would be required to maintain sufficient areas of land zoned suitably for expected future development.

Welfare:

The majority of welfare needs would be replaced by the UBI, but some benefits (including disability, sickness, sole parent, financial hardship, and youth support) are currently higher than the proposed UBI rate and would need extra support. These types of benefits are generally catering to unique circumstances and require a lot of flexibility and responsiveness to individual needs. According to the principle of subsidiarity, the best place for these types of decisions is as localised as possible, and for this reason I propose that all welfare needs beyond what the UBI cares for becomes the responsibility of local government within this dedicated division.

This division would be funded by property rates, which could be targeted towards the wealthiest portion of the population by charging it as a percentage of property values above a specific threshold. The national government would support local government and spread the burden among areas by matching any funds generated by the local government rates.

The elected welfare councillor would be responsible for deciding on the level of the welfare rate and would have sole discretion over deciding on a case-by-case basis how to support those who need it. Support could come in the form of monetary support, loans, or the provision of services, and would not require any complex rules or extensive bureaucracy to administer. Any support provided by this department would not be taxable to the beneficiary.

Social work and the care of orphans and children that have been removed from abusive or neglective homes would also be the responsibility of this division.

To discourage beneficiaries moving to take advantage of more generous policies, the councillor would have the discretion to require a minimum length of residency in the area before becoming eligible for support, unless there was a compelling reason for the move.

Fiscal Impact: I estimate the total national cost of these welfare departments to be $6 billion, of which the national government would contribute 50% or $3 billion.